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Among the most investigated concepts of contemporary analytic philosophy are those of 
knowledge and justification. These concepts are also the main topic of Kevin McCain’s 
Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments. In this exciting and much-
needed compendium, McCain presents 50 of the most fascinating puzzles in contemporary 
epistemology. The book is divided thematically into five parts: Parts I, II and III present 
puzzles from the most traditional areas of epistemology. Part I includes a selection of thought 
experiments from the analysis of knowledge debate; Part II comprises a wide array of 
skeptical challenges, ranging from the most classical ones, such as Descartes’ Demon and 
Russell’s five minutes old universe, to the newest, like the Debasing Demon and the idea of 
transformative experience. The puzzles in Part III deal with the nature of justification and 
provide a succinct while still very effective introduction to the debate between internalists and 
externalists about justification. Part IV acquaints the reader with one of the most intriguing 
among the relatively new subfields of epistemology, the study of social knowledge. Finally, 
Part V includes problems which are usually associated with so-called formal epistemology. 
Although this is not the case for all the puzzles in this section.  For instance, the Dogmatism 
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Puzzle (217) and Moore’s Paradox (235) have been mostly investigated by traditional 
epistemologists. 
Throughout the volume, the presentation of the puzzles is both rigorous and 
entertaining. For each case, McCain reviews some of the most significant treatments in the 
literature. The list of suggested readings at the end of each entry is stimulating and up to date. 
In short, this is an excellent resource, both for students and teachers, which promises 
to become a must for undergraduate epistemology courses. The puzzles can be taken as a 
starting point for lively class discussions, and the General Background sections which preface 
the different parts of the book make a really good job at providing the minimal background 
the students need to appreciate the significance of the puzzles and engage the discussion. 
However, McCain’s book is not only a teaching tool. It is also a great read for professional 
philosophers, for whom the author provides a self-contained but still accurate overview of the 
main issues and debates in contemporary epistemology. In the rest of this review, I would like 
to suggest that McCain’s compendium would be worth taking as a model for other 
publications. In particular, I would love to see another book complementing McCain’s 
perspective, which is mainly that of mainstream or traditional epistemology, concerned with 
formal epistemology. As mentioned above, in McCain’s book problems which traditionally 
belong to formal epistemology are to be found essentially in Part V, although not exclusively. 
Of course, formal epistemology and so-called traditional epistemology share a very 
large number of problems. And perhaps this should not come as a surprise, as, after all, the 
difference between the two kinds of epistemology — formal and traditional — is usually 
taken to consist in the kind of tools which are used to address the same issues.  In the case of 
formal epistemology, these are mainly logical and mathematical tools. For instance, the 
puzzle of group belief aggregation (200), and that of peer disagreement (191 and 196), which 
have in recent years generated a very technical literature, are prominent puzzles in the social 
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knowledge debate, and McCain rightly includes them in this category. However, some areas 
do exist which, historically, have mostly been of interest to formal epistemologists, and 
which, in my view, deserve to be included in an introductory work on epistemology. One of 
these areas is decision theory. McCain’s Epistemology only briefly deals with decision theory 
in the entry on transformative experience (104). A book, structurally similar to McCain’s, 
focusing on formal epistemology, would give the reader a broader perspective on decision 
theory, by including puzzles like Newcomb’s, Allais, and Saint Petersburg. 
One could perhaps object to this book project that it is an easier task to provide an 
overview of traditional epistemology via a collection of puzzles and thought experiments than 
it is to do the same for formal epistemology. Indeed, there are some important topics in the 
latter which it would be quite hard to transform into puzzles and address as such, or for 
which, at least, this operation would seem completely artificial. In fact, a guide to formal 
epistemology written in the spirit of McCain’s guide to traditional epistemology should 
probably include both puzzles and paradoxes, on the one hand, and presentations of the gist of 
important arguments on the other hand. 
A concept which would play an essential role in a formal epistemology supplementary 
to McCain’s guide would of course be probability. In McCain’s book probability and the so-
called Bayesian approach only receive a few mentions, essentially towards the end of the 
book itself. It seems to me that anyone interested in epistemology should master at least some 
basic probabilistic notions, and the good news here is that there are plenty of options for 
puzzles which are perfect for introducing fundamental bits of probability theory. I am 
thinking, for instance, of Tversky and Kahneman’s well-known taxicab problem (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1982), and of the Monty Hall problem, made famous by Marilyn Vos Savant’s 
famous column in Parade, both excellent tools for introducing Bayes’ rule in a fun way. 
Another example: the topic of inference to the best explanation, which McCain only touches 
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on, could also receive more attention in this complementary volume.  Examples from 
detective stories and the history of science could provide colorful illustrations. The author of a 
formal epistemology compendium should also devote some space to the epistemology of 
credences, completing McCain’s predominant focus on categorical belief. For instance, an 
entry could deal with the problem of what it means for one’s degrees of belief to be coherent, 
synchronically and/or diachronically. Trying to give an accessible presentation of the so-
called arguments for probabilism, i.e., the idea that our credences at a given time should 
satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus, would certainly represent a pedagogical 
challenge, but perhaps one worth taking. 
Probability is a technical notion, and one might worry that including it would mean 
having to provide the reader with technical tools which can hardly be introduced in an 
accessible and pleasant way. And, indeed, one of the many virtues of McCain’s Epistemology 
is its accessibility. However, it seems to me that providing some formal tools when needed, 
much as the General Background sections in McCain’s book supply some basic concepts and 
distinctions, would still be compatible with a final result which is both instructive and 
pleasant to read. After all, many successful examples of dissemination exist even in hard 
sciences, so I cannot see why we should not try to explain some important bits of formal 
epistemology in a pleasant way as well. 
In conclusion, I take McCain’s volume to be a model of how an epistemology book 
can be both rigorous and fun. Puzzles, paradoxes and thought experiments provide an 
extremely interesting outlook on epistemology, in fact, in my view, on philosophy in general. 
I hope that McCain’s book will serve as a model for other publications, including one on 
formal epistemology, which would complete the perspective on contemporary epistemology 
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